Introduction
Time perception can be seen as hav.ing two major divisions: subje~tive ume perception -the report~d f~ehng of personal, private or PSYChIC tIm~, and objective time perceptIOnthe Judgement made by a person with resp~ct to time. Both subjective time perceptIOn (5,8,11, 12 13 14161723,25) and objective time , , , , , perception (1O, 15,18,19,20,2~,28) . have received considerable attention In the clinical and experimental literatu~e but little direct attention has been paid to a possible relationship betwee~them.
Subjective time perceptIon can be divided into four categones: a) 'Protension' is a term already in use. It is applied to a reported feeling about the current passage of time, between two more or less fixed points of time -that is an interval. The near point fluctuates about the present. b) 'Retrotension', to coin an analogous term, may be applied to a reported feeling about time which has already elapsed. The points of this interval are more firmly fixed. The interval is often longer, extending from sometime in the past to further in the past. c) 'Temporal projection', to coin another term, is applied to cover a reported feeling extending from a near point, fluctuating about the present or firmly fixed in the near. future, to a°G These three divisions monitoring the three tenses, refer to discreet and rather transitory individual experiences. With these feelings there are a number of variables such as intensity, duration and frequency, but probably the most relevant is direction, i.e. whether time appears to pass quickly or slowly. d) 'Temporal orientation' is an established term referring to the tense preference and attitude of a person, a group or even a whole extant or past culture, nation or race, to 'pastness', 'presentness' and 'futu~·eness'. It is a state of mind -more universal and stable (though continuously evolving or changing) than protension, retrotension and temporal projection. The subdivisions of objective time perception correspond only to the three discreet subjective percepts monitored by the three tenses because the judgements themselves are single instances. They are:
a) The estimate of durr.tion of current interval. The near point is sharply defined in what we are pleased to call the present, and the distant point is sharply demarcated, necessarily, in the immediate past. b) Temporal localization or 'sinceness'. This involves the temporal localization of a single point, that is the judgement of when an event occurred; or an estimate of an interval between two points -that is how long it took. These take place entirely in the past. c) Temporal 'anticipatory estimate, to coin a third term, involves a judgement either to a single point in the future, or to an interval between two fixed points in the future, the near one closer to the present and the .distant one further in the future.
There are at least three possible ways to measure any estimate or judgement: amount of error, variability or stability of (repeated) judgements, an~dir~ction of error, i.e, over or underestimation of the standard.
Subjective time perception can be assumed to be governed by 'the internal clock' which has its own speed of running, perhaps independent of the 'external clock', on which all methods of objective time judgements or estimates are necessarily based. The relationship between these two clocks is complex and obscure. Bindra and Waksberg (3) have done much to clarify it. This paper, in the main, is also concerned with the relationship between the two clocks, or between subjective time perception and the objective estimate of time.
In order to activate the clinical interest of psychiatrists towards a more detailed study of time perception, one might state cryptically, that neurotic patients are sick with their hypertrophied or dilated orientation to pastness. Perhaps this pathology of the time sense of neurotics has led Freud and his followers to what Ralph Barton Perry (21) called the atavistic fallacy: that something occurring in the past necessarily determines something occurring in the present. Obsessive, especially phobic patients, are sick with their hypertrophied orientation to futureness. They are so concerned, ultimately with death, that they live their lives with one foot in the grave all the time, anticipating more and more the distant future -pushing death. Psychopathic patients, on the other hand, are precariously balanced on the narrow ledge of the immediate present; their 'futureness' is foreshortened so that threats have short-lived value; their 'pastness' contracted so that past events (e.g. punishments) have little effect on behaviour. Patients with de-. realization and depersonalization states, separate personal from clock time, perhaps by 'a greater distance than normal persons. Always being late and chrono-phobia are almost pure time perception syndromes.
. . One would think that such clinical experience and conceptualization would have led, long ago, to the hypothesi~th~t the temporal performance of psychiatric patients was significantly differe?-t from that of non-patients, and that t.hIs hypothesis would be tested experimentally, Actually this has been done but rarely and only recently (18) . H?wever, .the extreme psychiatric population, schizophrenic patients, was selected, perhaps on the suppositio~that~hey h~ve a definite disturbance in reality testing. And how else to test reality basically but by means of such crucial orientational percepts as time perception? F~nally, with respect to the relevanc~of time to p~y chiatry, both the notions of maturity and the related one of integration of personality (4, 5, 20, 22, 26) may be m~as ured if we had a good measure of time perception.
In order to begin to assess the relevance of time perception to psychiatric phenomena and also to begin to und.erstand the significance of time perceptIO?as herein classified, the present expenment set out to determine whether there is a relationship between subjective time perception, as indexed by protension, and objective time perception, as indexed by estimates of current interval.
The experimental literature on this point is practically non-existent. but the little evidence there is argues agamst such a relationship. In previous work on sensory isolation (2), and N20 inhalation (24) , it was found that subjects who reported time running very quickly or very slowly, or even that time was infinite or standing still, failed to underestimate or over-estimate consistently when judging the current interval.
The present study approache? the question through a two-stage expenment. In the first stage psychiatric patients selected for complaints of derealization and depersonalization, which would favour fairly constant distortions of pro-Vol. 9, No.5 tension, were compared with non-patient controls on estimation of current time intervals. The subjects (Ss) were then dichotomized in terms of report of time distortions in their past (past distorters and non-distorters) and were again compared for differences in estimation of current time intervals. Finally, the subjects were dichotomized in terms of report of time distortions while performing time judgements (current distorters and non-distorters) and the same comparisons were again carried out.
In the second stage of the experiment, Ss were exposed to four experimental conditions which have been shown to induce distortions in protension (2, 7, 8, 9) . Testing was then carried out to determine whether e~posure to these conditions also influenced Ss' judgement of current time intervals. In addition, group comparisons were carried out to determine whether exposure to these conditions had differential effects on, a) patients as opposed to controls, b) past distorters (PD) as opposed to non-distorters (ND) and, c) current distorters (CD) as opposed to ND.
Performance in estimating current intervals was assessed in terms of three indices: amount of error of estimate, amount of variability of estimate and direction of error of estimate (i.e. overestimation and underestimation).
Method
Subjects-The Ss consisted of 20 serially selected psychiatric patients with complaints of depersonalization or derealization and 20 non-patient controls equated with patients for age, sex and length of schooling.
Experimental Conditions-The four conditions, described more fully elsewhere (2,7,8,9,) , which were used to induce changes in prorension were: 1) Caloric Labyrinthine stimulation (CLS) -the. running of 8 oz of water at 15°C to the right ear drum in 40 secs.,
2) Rotation -the turning of S to the right at 32 r.p.m. for 3 min., in a rotating chair, with eyes open and head moving backward and forward in a ratio of one movement for every two body rotations;
3) Sensory isolation of S in a room with diminished auditory (15 db), kinesthetic and tactile input, 'in total darkness for three hours, and; 4) Sleep deprivation -50 hours of sleep deprivation carried out ina group setting. Exposure to successive conditions was at minimum intervals of three days. Tests of Time Perception-The three classical (3) methods of time judgement of current interval were used: verbal estimate (VE), production (P) and reproduction (R).
VE was asking S to estimate verbally (the judgement) an interval predetermined by a lapse of clock time (the standard) which was measured by the experimenter (E). P was asking S to delimit operatively (the judgement), in this case by activating a buzzer, an interval of predetermined duration (the standard) given verbally by E.
R was asking S to reproduce operatively (the judgement), again by activating the buzzer, an interval of the same duration as that which had been previously presented operatively (the standard) by E pressing a buzzer for a length of time measured by E against clock time.
Four current time intervals, n sees., 1n sees., 3 mins. 'and 45 mins. were employed. When feasible each of the three methods of time judgement was applied to each time interval. Protension was measured through a questionnaire requiring S to report and describe changes in his feelings about the passage of time.
Procedure-Tests of time judgement were administered first under normal laboratory conditions and then before, during and on recovery from each of the distorting conditions. Under the normal laboratory condition eight tests were administered. All three methods of judgement were used for the nand 17~sec. intervals. For the 3 min. and 45 min. intervals it was possible to use only the VE method. The relatively short duration (about 4 minutes) of two of the distorting conditions limited the number of tests that could be administered. Two tests, In-sec. P and 3 min. VE, were selected as most representative of time intervals and methods of judgement, and were the only tests administered during the conditions. The order of administering the tests was random with the restriction that tests involving the production method were administered last because they supplied a verbal standard which might have influenced Ss' subsequent performance. All tests except the 3 min. VE and the 45 min. VE tests were administered twice during each testing period. The Ss were instructed not to count or use any other time-keeping devices while making time judgements.
Immediately following every testing period Ss completed the protension questionnaire. The same type of questionnaire was administered at the beginning of the experiment requiring 5 to report and describe changes in time perception he had experienced previous to the experiment.
Results

Stage 1. N ormal laboratory testing
The judgemental performance of patients and controls, in terms of per cent of Ss over-estimatingt the standard, amount of error and variability of performance, is presented in Table I . Clearcut differences between the two groups failed to emerge on any index. On four out of the eight tests more patients than controls over-estimated and on the other four, more controls over-estimated. Individual X' tests failed to yield a significant difference on any test although VE 45 min. showed a strong tendency for more patients than controls to overestimate. The index of amount of error showed a more consistent trend. Patients tDirection of error is reported in terms of per cent of Ss over-estimating the standard because this was the general tendency shown throughout the data. made more errors than controls on seven out of the eight tests, but the difference was statistically significant on only the 45 min. VE (t=2.42 for 18 d.f., p<.05). The index of variability of performance showed no tendency to differentiate patients and controls. On the other hand the protension questionnaire showed that during both their previous life and the testing period more patients than controls reported distortions in time perception. However, the difference failed to reach statistical significance.
A comparison of the performance of Ss who reported having distortions in the past (PO), with Ss who did not report such distortions (NO) is presented in Table II . Comparisons were again carried out in terms of amount of error, variability of performance and tendency to over-estimate the standard. Once. again clear differences failed to emerge. On four out of the eight tests more POs than NOs over-estimated the standard. On the other four tests more NOs over-estimated the standard. Individual X' tests failed to yield a significant difference on any test although there was a strong tendency for more non-distorters to overestimate on VE 45 minutes. On the index of amount of error POs were higher on six out of the eight tests, but t-tests failed to indicate a statistically significant difference on any of these. The index of variability of performance also failed to reveal any significant differences between POs and NOs.
A comparison of the performance of Ss who reported time distortions during the testing period (CD) with those who did not report such distortions (NO) is presented in Table III . On six of the eight tests more NOs than CDs overestimated the standard. Once again, however, the difference failed to reach significance in any instance. The index of amount of error also gave consistent evidence. On seven of the eight tests, CDs made more errors than NOs, but in no case was the difference significant. The index of variability failed to reveal either consistent or significant differences. Stage 1 was therefore completed without any clear evidence of a subjective-objective relationship in time perception.
The significance of the difference between patients and controls in amount of error and variability on the nand 17~sees. tests, was assessed through three-way analysis of variance techniques. These techniques also gave information on the effect of the duration of the interval (n sees, us. 1n secs.) and the effect of the method of testing (P us, R us. VE) on both amount of error and variability. The analysis of variance of amount of error showed that the type of test had a significant effect (p<.OOl); that the duration of the time interval had a significant effect (p < .001) and that the interaction between these variables was significant (p<.OOI). The VE method gave the greatest error, the R method the least and more error occurred on the 17~sec. tests than on the 7s ec. tests. The interaction effect can be interpreted as evidence that the difference in amount of error between the judgements of n sees, and 17~sees. was greater under VE than under P or R. The analysis of variance of amount of variability indicated that the only relevant variable was the type of test used (p<.Ol). Performance was much more variable on VE than on either P or R.
In summary, the comparison of patients and controls failed to indicate any clear difference in judgement of time. The only reliable difference was in terms of amount of error on VE 45 min. While this may be a spurious finding it may also be related to the fact that the amount of error increase.d as a positive function of the duration of the interval. It may well be that differences between patients and controls become more pronounced as the length of the interval is increased beyond 45 minutes. It is also of some interest to note that while error increased with interval, the ratio of error to interval actually decreased on the four VE tests. On VE n sees. the ratio was 1.5, for 1n it was 1.3, for 3 min. it was 0.6 and for 45 min. 0.4.
Stage 2. Distorting Condition Testing
A comparison of patients and controls before, during 'and after exposure to the four experimental conditions in terms of the indices of error and variability of performance, is presented in Table IV . Inspection of the data in Table IV shows no consistent tendency for the conditions to alter performance from the pre-or post-testing periods and gives no indication of poorer performance by patients than by controls. Statistical analyses support this impression.
Individual two-way analyses of variance were carried out on the data from each condition. In no case was exposure to the condition found to have a statistically significant effect on time judgement in terms of either error or variability. Furthermore, there was no significant difference between the patients and controls in performance under the four experimental conditions. The index of per cent of Ss over-estimating the standard also failed to give a clear differentiation between the groups. On the two tests (P 1n sees, and VE 3 min.) administered under each of the four conditions (eight tests in all) more controls than patients over-estimated on five, and the reverse was true for the other three.
A comparison of the performance of POs and NOs under the four experimental conditions is presented in Table V . Under sleep deprivation and CLS more non-disorters than distorters over-estimated the 1n sec. interval, while under sensory deprivation and rotation the opposite held true. Under every condition, however, more POs than NOs over-estimated the 3 min. standard; but the differences were small and failed to reach significance on X 2 tests. A similar picture emerged on the indices of error and variability. The slight differences that occured were in the direction of more error and variability on the part of NOs than PDs but no differences were significant. The final comparison, presented in Table VI , was in terms of CDs and NOs during the experimental conditions. Once again, there was a tendency for more NOs than CDs to over-estimate the standard but here also the difference between the groups was not significant. Individual t-tests were carried out to determine whether the groups differed reliably in terms of error or variability under any of the conditions. In each case the differences were not significant. Inspection shows that the differences were generally small with no evidence of a trend in favour of either group.
In summary, the results give a fairly consistent answer to the question of the relationship between protension and current time estimate. Neither depersonalized or derealized psychiatric patients, nor protensive time distorters (past or current) showed any reliable difference from their controls in current time estimation, either under normal resting conditions or when exposed to conditions which have been shown to induce changes in protension, Furthermore it was found that exposure to these conditions failed to have any reliable effect on time judgements.
Discussion
The results failed to indicate any basic relationship between subjective time perception and objective time perception. As such they are consistent with those of earlier experiments (2, 24) . It should be noted that this study went beyond the usual format of such perceptual studies in the categorization and manipulation of populations. First the broadest category of patients and their matched controls were compared; then the narrower one of Ss with past changes in protension and finally the narrowest one of immediate current subjective distorters. Thus in this repect negative findings were remarkable indeed.
It is important to realize, however, that the~resent experiment provides a limited test of the general hypothesis. Although the three classical methods of time estimation were employed, the study involved only protension, short of gross disorientation and dealt with its relation to only four time intervals.
That the duration of the time interval might be an important variable is evident, both from the present results and the literature. The results show that the amount of error significantly increased with the duration of the interval judged, and that patients were differentiated from controls when the interval reached 45 minutes. The literature indicates that schizophrenics (an extreme population) are differentiated from controls when the interval is reduced to one second (18) . It might therefore be suggested that a subjective-objective relationship holds only at very short and very long time intervals and that the interval sampled under present experiment fell between these crucial points.
The fact that the study involved only protension on the subjective side and estimates of current interval on the objective side might also be important. Relationships may exist between any of the other subjective indices, say retrotension or temporal projection on one hand and temporal localization or anticipation on the other. The present experiment explored only one of the possible relationships between the four subjective and three objective aspects of time perception.
The intensity of protension can also be seen as an important limitation. Clinical experience suggests that extreme conditions such as amnesia and gross disorientation seem to bring about a complete coincidence of the subjective and objective aspects of time perception. None of the manipulations involved in the present study approached such extreme states.
Perhaps the greatest disappointment came from the fact that variability, as an index of time judgement, failed to reveal differences between groups. It was ... s .., t"l 'tj hoped ( 1) that variability rather than error indices might differentiate better between patients and controls (or time distorters and non-distorters). Unfortunately, variability like magnitude of error, failed to provide any consistent differentiation.
The general problem of a subjectiveobjective relation in time perception is complicated considerably by the fact that the methods of time judgement, e.g. VE, P and R, were found to affect both error and variability of judgement. Magnitude of error and variability was greatest on VE. This seems reasonable in that VE appears most prone to dynamics and verbal stereotypes, e.g. "wait a minute", "half a moment", etc. Moreover, the actual time elapsed is always an interval of the immediate past which has to be estimated retrospectively. R, producing least error and variability, as Bindra and Waksberg (3) among others pointed out, is an entirely different thing. It seems much more dependent on sensory cues or stimulation, e.g. kinaesthetic, visual or auditory, and, in these experiments, the sensory stimulation filled the time interval homogeneously. The R response to the sensory cue and the standard in a filled interval is more psychophysiologic than the VE response. P, falling between VE and R in terms of error and variability seems different again in that the standard or request is present to future oriented, whereas in VE and R it is present to past. As has been found in trying to measure intrapsychic factors (6) and as Clausen (10) and Bindra and ':Vaksberg (3) emphasize in time percepnon, the method of measurement, in this case the type of test of current time estimate, determines the responses to a great extent.
Of course these results may simply indicate that when one comes to the brass tacks of psychiatric phenomenology, which is almost completely subjective, this activity may go on relatively independently from objective behaviour, especially task performance, even if the task involves a judgement of a reality situation (viz. clock time), which corresponds to a subjective feeling which is grossly and habitually distorted, viz. feelings about time. The task itself may bring consciousness and normal judgemental faculties into focus which eleminate or displace for that time the subjective distortions. The latter may remain in abeyance until, perhaps, the subject is free from the task, from the dipping which takes place when the observer seeks to measure the subjective phenomenon. In other words the results may reflect Heisenberg's uncertainty principle which states that the very actions implicated in observation alter the phenomenon observed (by changing the relative relationship between the observer and the object). Surely this must be greatly enhanced when the object is psychological rather than physical.
Notwithstanding, it behoves one to attempt to measure the objective counterpart of the subjective (perceptual) phenomena. And if the relationship is not strong enough to come through clearly it behoves one to try and find means ot amplifying it so as to overcome the 'noise effect' of extraneous variables. In a subsequent study, we are endeavouring to do this through a different kind of approach, namely the positive feedback (PF) method (19) in which the standard given, after the first one, is S's own response fed back to him on requested trials. The PF method causes a push effect, a fairly consistent and continuous under-estimation or over-estimation to a point of balance. The results appear more stable (on all three methods of time judgement) than the single shot response or judgement. That is the noise effect, so evident throughout the present data, seems less. There is a possibility that with this measuring method, patients and time distorters will differ in performance from their controls.
Summary
Experimentation was carried out to test for a relationship between subjective time perception and ability to make temporal judgements. The performance of 20 depersonalized and derealized patients and 20 controls, was compared on a variety of tests of time judgement administered under normal laboratory conditions and under conditions which have been shown to induce or amplify distortions in subjective temporal experience. The results failed to indicate any reliab1e relationship between subjective temporal experience and ability to make time judgements. The performance of patients did not differ reliably from that of controls under any of the testing conditions; exposure to distorting conditions did not have a reliable effect on temporal performance and Ss who reported temporal distortions either in their past life or while actually performing the tests of time judgement, failed to perform differently from Ss who did not report distortions.
perception subjective du temps et la capacite de porter des jugements temporels. La performance de 20 malades depersonnalises et ne se rendant pas compte de la realite, et de 20 temoins, a ete comparee au moyen d'une variete d'epreuves de jugements temporels, adrninistrees dans des conditions ordinaires de laboratoire et dans des conditions qui se sont revelees capables d'induire ou d'amplifier les deformations de I'experience temporelle subjective. Les resultats n'ont indique aucun rapport digne de confiance entre l'experience temporelle subjective et la capacite de porter des jugements temporels. La performance des malades n'a pas differe sensiblement de celle des temoins, dans aucune des conditions d'epreuve, l'exposition aux conditions de deformation n'ont pas eu un effet bien precis sur la performance ternporelle et les sujets qui ont signale des deformations temporelles soit dans leur vie anterieure, soit en executant les epreuves de jugement temporel, n'ont pas agi differemment de ceux qui n'avaient pas sign-ale de deformations. To facilitate a successful program planning, it is essential that contributions and suggestions be received on time.
